Hydrocarbons and power in Libya since 2011

      Since the elimination of Gaddafi in 2011, oil has become a strategic issue for those in power. It is, at the same time, a source of power for the supply elite, and a destructive weapon for the opponents, in order to deprive the official government of the revenues which will be used for the purchase of weapons, knowing that the hydrocarbons sector brings 98% of external revenue and represents nearly 80% of GDP.

Indeed,since the assassination of Muammar Gaddafi, two clans are competing for power in Libya, that of General Khalifa Haftar in Tobruk (Head of the regular army and recognized by the international community) and Fajr Libya in Tripoli. A third clan, Ansar Al Charia, which seized Benghazi and shares the cities of Derna and Sirte with Daesh was able to get their hands on several oil fields, without however officially claiming power, because unofficially, it supports the Fajr Libya clan.

In addition to all these factions, we also count -the separatists, which marked the oil war in Libya, and took advantage of the failure of state institutions as well as the conflict between the two governments to self-proclaim the return to federalism. This is the movement controlled by Ibrahim el Jadhran, an Islamist anti militia leader, who participated in the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011. On March 6 2012, Ahmed Zubair al-Senussi, a nephew of Idris I ^er, declares that he wants to establish federalism in accordance with the 1951 constitution¹. Despite the revocability of his decision, as well as the hostility of the people to such a distribution, he succeeded in empowering the province of Cyrenaica, by obtaining the support of various movements favorable to federalism, including that of Ibrahim el- Jadhran. Indeed, in July 2013, the latter blocked the oil fields of the said province, after being commissioned by the CGN to ensure their security, and decreed, on November 5 2013, the autonomy of the province of Cyrenaica².

Wishing to face the unequal redistribution of the oil manna by the official government, Ibrahim el- Jadhran considers that he can equitably distribute oil revenues among the three federations of the country: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. He even created an oil company called  » Libya Oil and Gas Corp  », a bank in the State of Cyrenaica, as well as a television station. The support of the various tribes from which Ibrahim el- Jadhran benefits, enabled him to establish his authority in the region and negotiate with the government of Tobruk the conditions for reviving the production of the oil fields that it has blocked, especially those of Ras Lanuf and Al- Sedra. The blockade of these terminals not only caused the country’s oil production to drop, but also cost the official government billions of dollars. However, the income from the sale of hydrocarbons, since the end of 2011, has only served to pay the salaries of civil servants.    

Since the control of the capital  » Tripoli  » by the militias of Fajr Libya in August 2014, which chose, as stronghold Mistra, remarkably close to Tripoli, a new government called  » General National Libyan Congress  » (CGNL) which competes with the government  » Official  » of the country was installed in Tobrouk (Benghazi) in the east of the country. Although the national oil company has been established in Tripoli since its creation in 1970 the government in Tobruk has referred to its questionable links with the authorities in Tripoli and has rejected the CGNL’s authorization to conclude any oil contract with the foreign companies. Following this situation of denial, the official government proceeded to create a new national oil company in order to be able to explore and market Libyan oil. Currently, Libya has two NOCs, two governments, two parliaments and two oil ministries³.

In the absence of a political compromise between the two governments, the official authorities tried to get their hands on the country’s energy resources, they opened  a new bank account in the United Arab Emirates and negotiated with the multinationals to stop their partnerships with the former NOC. Unfortunately, the bet is far from won for the government of Tobruk, which is faced, on the one hand, with technical and material difficulties for the establishment of its new oil company, and on the other hand, with the impossibility of put an end to the contracts that bound foreign oil companies to the NOC. It has not ceased to assert its neutrality and the need to keep the energy sector out of political discord. However, the continuity of the oil contracts concluded between the NOC and the multinationals is, more than ever, at the heart of the debates between the two rival governments, especially since the official government considers that any commercial exchange with the NOC is assimilated to a financing of terrorist groups⁴.

                           The Geopolitics of natural resources: 

Control of oil sites, a vital interest for both sides of the civil war in Libya

Indeed, the oil war to which the two governments have been engaged has halved oil production, which fell from 1.5 mb / d in 2011 to nearly 350,000 b / d, which sharply reduced oil production. national economy. A situation which prompted the NOC to declare a “state of force majeure” in order to limit its liability in the event of breach of its contractual obligations. Moreover, since the overthrow of Gaddafi, eleven oil fields, such as AL-Mabrouk, Al- Bahi and Dahra have suffered multiple attacks from the jihadists. A few of them, located in the Sirte and Fezzan regions, fell into the hands of militias from Fajr Libya and Daesh. In addition, the regions of Benghazi and Derna are entirely controlled by Daesh and the jihadists of Ansar al Sharia.  

The lack of support in arms and money, at national and international level, increasingly weakened the position of the official government which lost a large majority of the national territory (Tripolitania, Fezzan, and part of Cyrenaica). Added to this is the reluctance of foreign companies to maintain contractual relations with the new NOC. Despite his persistent appeals, the Prime Minister of the Tobruk government, Abdallah Al- Thinni, is struggling to convince international buyers to buy the oil that his company sells, especially as the export terminals under the control of official authorities are often the target of attacks. The guarantees that Al- Thinni can offer to buyers and foreign companies are extremely limited, and the main NOC still enjoys the confidence of international operators.

   Today 60% of petroleum resources are held by Marshal Haftar, who got his hands on the fertile crescent including the Sirte basin in the east of the country. The Ras Lanuf refinery provides Haftar with more than 200,000 barrels per day , in addition to some 300,000 barrels extracted from two other oil sites located in Mourzouk and Ghadames.  

As a result, the situation in Libya continues to deteriorate. Although the government of Tobruk is supported  by many countries (including Algeria and Egypt), on the ground, he has struggled for years to assert its authority over the government of Tripoli, which has benefited, too, support from countries like Qatar and Turkey. The failure of its operation called  » al Karama  » or  » dignity « , launched on May 16, 2014, to take over the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi attests to the country’s decay. At the end of 2014, General Haftar asked his allies, in particular Egypt, to intervene militarily in Libya to defeat the Islamists. 

The international community urges the various parties to find a compromise of national unity very quickly for two reasons: the first is to prevent the spread of terrorism in the whole region. The second is to stop the flow of migrants to Europe. Insecurity in many countries in the region, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa (Libya, Syria, Sudan, etc.) has resulted in the exodus of populations to Europe via the Mediterranean, which also weighs heavily on, economically, on the countries of Europe. Indeed, after having contributed to the destabilization of the region (invasion of Iraq, overthrow of Gaddafi, maintenance of Bashar Al Assad in power, etc.), the Western countries (United States, France, United Kingdom, etc.) seem overwhelmed by the escalation of interregional conflicts, because the consequences of their interference are also shaking Europe (problems of illegal immigration, the terrorist threat, the orientation of a large part of public expenditure towards armaments , etc).     

  In addition, the Libyan people are deprived of the only source of income the country has. Production fell from more than two million barrels per day in 2011 to less than 400,000 barrels / d due to the blocking of production terminals and ports by Marshal Haftar to deprive the government of Fayez Al-Sarraj oil revenues because of its advance on the ground thanks to Turkish aid. A provisional agreement to revive the production and export of oil was recently concluded between Khalifa Haftar and Ahmed Maïtig (vice-president of the Presidential Council and deputy prime minister of the government of national unity) after Fayez Al-Sarraj announced his resignation from the current government. 

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 The internationalization of the Libyan conflict: a source for a long-term insecurity

       The Libyan stake to pass from a fragile state to a failed state still a constant danger for Libya and all the region because of the failure of different diplomatic initiatives that presented at various level by the African Union (AU), the Arab League (AL), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the European Union (EU). 

    After nine years of internal chaos, the responsibility is shared by two meaningful actors especially from Haftar who violates each ceasefire as a tactical movement to reverse the situation in his favor and the political agreement of Skhirat in 2015 who confirmed the crisis of legitimacy between the Government of national accord (GNA) and the Libyan national army (LNA). Those enemy brothers keep a considerable position to build a new area of institutions. The trajectory appears as a priority according to the constitutional document and specially to opt for a general consent as the general framework of the UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) with two other fundamental objectives: reformulating a Libyan national polity and holding general elections while more than two million Libyans have put their names on the electoral register.

   That bankruptcy comes from the failure of Libya to ensure the internal security as the core indicator to define a failed state which the spread of militias (the exercise of legitimate physical violence has been scattered) and the principal role of the Islamic State in Libya backed by Majlis Choura Chabab al Islam from 2014 in Derna (the emergence of Terrorism). Furthermore, that internal collapse may become a source of several conflict in the region especially with the decline of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the crisis in the eastern Mediterranean in which Erdogan engaged Turkey in a bilateral agreement with the GNA on the delimitation of the common maritime borders of these countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, an agreement that could be a source on a regional war (Egypt, Greece, Cyprus against Turkey).

    Indeed, that circle seems to be geostrategic, which the civil war appears like a homogeneous choice to exacerbate the situation to arbitrate it not only diplomatically but with all possible means especially on with the military tools to defend their interests and to guarantee an influence in the region. This choice is affirmed by the transgression of all the internal parties and their external allies of all UN resolutions. The UN seems incapable of ensuring a simple humanitarian relief. The internationalization of the conflict poses a geostrategic nightmare to the UN’s efforts towards stabilization   It has upped the stakes for Libya’s civil war, posing an even greater threat to international security⁵, so that this miserable geopolitical situation whom the Libyan citizens assume harmful consequences result not only from the 2011 intervention assisted by the NATO but also from a historical series of popular revolutions known as the Arab uprising which  was supposed to eradicate all the authoritarian regimes in the region,

As a result,  chaos and  polarization were the only negative response, the interference of certain regional states, as well as superpowers, has solidified the stubbornness and obduracy of these conflicts. Prime Minister el-Sarraj has stated foreign interference “is making the situation more difficult. It is not helping Libyans sit down and find a solution”⁶.

    The Gulf State Competition: Qatar vs UAE

That civil war had known at its debut a considerable regional intervention from certain Arab forces that searched to get some influence as a maximization to secure  their position and protect their traditional monarchical model from any negative effects of the spread of the Arab Spring. This situation has been represented by the Gulf States especially the role of Qatar and UAE, two states which benefit from a geostrategic protection of the USA, a position providing a security umbrella with the eminent American presence  :  Al Udeid air base in Qatar and Al-Dhafra air base in the UAE, That protection stimulate them to build an independent line in their foreign policy for several known reasons.

During the Libyan Revolution, Qatar and the UAE had been in a regional lead to support the military revolution (financial assistance, military training for the rebels) and to support the political process by assisting the National Transition Council to be the official representative for the Libyans. The UAE joined Qatar in leading the charge for finding Arab solutions to Arab problems. Together, they provided military and financial assistance that proved critical in the international coalition and the eventual success of the NTC⁷.

The Gulf countries: the new center of the Arab World, military confrontations by proxy in the Libyan territory « Qatar vs Saudi Arabia / UAE »

The complexity of events that came with a political context of “elections” in August 2012 who is result a significant rise of the Islamist Party (Justice and Construction Party) as the second political force in the parliament, secured 17 seats and 19 smaller parties secured 24 seats. That success of an Islamism political organization was sufficient to turn the scenario of Gulf Leadership to a brutal mirage.

Moreover, At that level the confrontation was total, since proxy warfare is a choice that serves the interests of both side, as a normal result: the National Forces Alliance (NFA) was a principal ally of the UAE until the upcoming of Haftar who’s been an effective card for them as military leader which shows itself as the right profile compatible with the mentality of Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ) as military leader, for all this reasons, the meeting organized by Abu Dhabi in 2017 was considered as a waste of time, two years after (27 March 2019) the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Emirati representatives reportedly meet with Haftar in Riyadh and decide to launch a military offensive to take Tripoli.

At the other side, Qatar delimited since the debut of the Arab spring, an engaged support to all the islamist political parties as the most organized political forces and for all the opposition figures of Muaamar Qadhafi, with their own tools (Al Jazeera), the Qatari Smart power has been reinforcer over time in the second civil war, with the furniture of equipment and training for revolutionary militias as a normal procedure to defend their national interests to expand her regional influence.

   However the secondary role that played the terrorist group especially the ISIS, that gave a powerful proof to the international interference with a relative external legitimacy (prevent the protection of borders, the protection of their national interests, the desire to avoid a non-profitable chaos), but that temporary entrance was dangerous due to the ease of being able to have a leading role in scene of general disorder, that indicators mentioned by W. Pusztai in his article “what makes Libya a better place for terrorists”  as an example (its geostrategic important location, the plentiful hydrocarbon resources, the failure of the Islamism parties to exercise a sustainable control on the country. The two major sides of the civil war are fragmented and busy fighting each other, Libya maintains the ninth largest reserves of crude oil globally, In Syria and Iraq, ISIS is under heavy pressure).

  Egypt:  A national Security dossier 

As a result of that insecure territory, the borders become insecure and a source of instability for Egypt which shared with Libya nearly 1,2000 kilometers and mostly barren desert. The similarity of profile with Abdel Fatah Sissi as the top of an authoritarian regime (after a  controversial constitutional revision ballot organized in 2019 who reinforce his position by giving him the right to remain in power  until 2024 with the possibility to renew his presidential mandate for another six years)  and high military responsible in the overthrown regime, their objectives still the same, form a large dimension of their legitimacy with a pure security management : fight the extremism and the islamist political movement  as a threat to spread their influence to reach power.

So, Egypt was  weakened after The June 30 Revolution (the coup d’Etat in 2013), this internal weakness was exacerbated by other fronts representing a security threat to Egypt, hence the failure to wipe out extremist groups in Sinai. Presently, with the drums of war beating along the Libyan front, terrorism has also flared up again in Sinai, a clear warning sign to Sisi that he should not neglect the east part of the territory⁸ , the strained relationship with Ethiopia known as the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis. That situation puts  Sissi in front of two issues : he has to choose between the hammer of the necessity to prepare a large package of economic reforms to guarantee a relative internal stability for its 100 million inhabitants and the anvil to stay  a major actor in the Libyan dossier as a question of national security, defending the national interests like a potential gain of regional influence: gain access to natural resources.

Furthermore, that commitment took place at the beginning of the second Libyan war (the launch of the Operation of dignity in 2014), the argument was adopted from the counterterrorism discourse of Haftar. That choice seems natural for the reasons we have already mentioned above and can be easily understood given the Sissi’s failure  to convince the leaders of some influential tribes to join Haftar which his trial to give them the last decision to decide was unconvincing for them « We will enter Libya at your request and leave it on your order ».

At the end of what Egypt did in the Libyan dilemma, its  geostrategic role allowed the country  to  remain far t from the problem and become  a potential partner to solve it not for the Libyans but for her National Security as one of the meaningful axes of the international system (National Interest).

On one hand, Egypt foreign policy plays with a significant paradigm of path-dependence to justify ? its  limited ability to intervene in a bloody long-term war  in Libya especially if the war will be an absolute war, a direct one (the Clausewitz conception of war). As a result, Egypt risks losing much of its reputation despite its 9th place in the ranking of armies in the world, the first military power in Africa and in the Arab World (Source : Global Fire Power), For the moment, Egypt is still under the protective umbrella of USA and UAE who expects from  it to put an end to the ramp-up of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya as common objective.

Nonetheless, although Cairo has brought several influential players into alignment behind Haftar, Egyptian officials are not naive to the LNA’s strengths and weaknesses. Cairo believes that the LNA is realistically in no position to achieve a military victory over the GNA and its allied militias⁹.

On the other hand, The Declaration of Cairo in June 2020 is another disappointing attempt to give Haftar an extra time to absorb his defeat after GNA forces managed to control the entrance gate of Watiya air base in May 2020. That declaration sought to implement some Key points on the 18-month transitional period for instance, : “ A ceasefire should start at 6 am (4 GMT) 8 June”. It also stipulates the continuation of talks by the 5+5. The initiative also sees the adoption of a constitutional declaration that governs the upcoming period politically. An initiative that has been ignored except from those who  backed the LNA and the Eastern camp like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrein, Jordan.

Indeed, It seems difficult to renew the process from the beginning without being neutral, the UN does not  accept to grant easily its  management to some actors known for some transgressions of human rights and international humanitarian law, Again, the only way to de-escalate the conflict and reassert the sovereignty of Libya—without the interference of external regional players—is to return to a UN-proposed solution supported by non-aligned states, whose role has to be strengthened through recognized international norms¹⁰.

                                  Turkey: A powerful engagement in the regional crises

A potential  direct confrontation between Turkey and France, a new era in the Libyan conflict

That situation of instability pushes some states to intervene as a realistic solution to defend their national interest. Turkey is one of them, a state who seeks to keep its  increasing  influence on North Africa. The discovery of the gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean was the appropriate opportunity to set ties with the GNA as a consistent choice, with an international legitimacy (bilateral agreement).

 In fact, it was an offensive reaction especially after the Turkish parliament approved the possibility of military interference in Libya on the 2nd of January 2020. Before that, the international context  (the support of the UN) had  played in favor of turkey in the establishment of  the maritime frontiers with Libya on the November 2019, Two strategic events made the road clear to get a common objective on the 14 April 2020: GNA forces with Turkish air support recapture several western coastal cities, including Sabratha and Surman, extending GNA control west from Tripoli to border with Tunisia.

Turkey may adopt a more interventionist position  , by enforcing a maritime arms embargo without a simultaneous blockade of arms coming overland from the UAE which  would, in effect, help Haftar. This calculation no doubt factored into Turkey’s decision to take matters into its own hands¹¹.

Furthermore, this support expresses differently today: from simple diplomatic recognition to military assistance and cooperation as a counterpart of the creation of an exclusive economic zone, it made  Turkey one of the most invested countries in the Libyan War, viewed currently  as a former support of the UN efforts especially with the diversification of its military assistance tools: military equipment (drones, armored combat vehicles) and despite the embargo imposed since 2011 by the UN against the country. Mercenaries were already on the ground, mostly from the Syrian part occupied by Turkey¹².

What Turkey proved is far from showing a unilateral mindset  to find a solution for the Libyan civil war, the nature of it ties with the legitimate government of Prime Minister Faïez el-Sarraj, his military superiority, the legal bilateral ties seem to be elements taken into account to  conduct the ambition of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  The objective is to endure the military commitment as a beneficial scenario to ensure that new position on the process of peacemaking in Libya and on the dynamics of the crisis in Mediterranean.

In addition to that, by recalling that in the framework of military strategy, the deployment of ground forces in an irregular war like in Libya reveals several things that make the decision too costly for both good and evil, taking as an example the American intervention in Vietnam or Afghanistan. This military involvement of Turkey clearly shows the degree of commitment, the political stakes, but also the strategic ambition of exercising an exclusive leadership in the region.

This period of unrest from the onset of the Arab Spring as well as the failure of post-revolutionary political solutions, created an opportunity for some states to engage in open economic competition to maximize the national gain with different approaches. So, Turkey put its foreign policy at  the service of the civil wars of this region talking of its major role in Syria as in Libya, this state of affairs proves its capacity today to interfere in various external grounds while passing from the famous doctrine of “zero problem” to a new doctrine « in search of all the problems ». That change of strategy did not appear  as a force of peace in a region which  needs a huge amount of rest and peace, affirming moreover that this support made it possible to « rebalance » the situation in Libya¹³.

                        France : A destabilizing force in the Libyan territory

First, the French position explains more than ever the absence of a consistent foreign policy or the continuity between the different presidents. The Libyan dossier is a simple proof since the French intervention under the presidency of Sarkozy in 2011 as part of the NATO operation « unified protector »¹⁴ where France participated with its Rafales aircrafts.

It is obvious that France is trying  to fix its  political agenda after the post-revolution area by redefining the bilateral relationship with Libya. That intention was confirmed by referring to the military assistance without questioning the policy choice. In fact, on the ground, the clandestine forces of the DGSE were already in place at that time…The presence of French soldiers at the Benina air base, about twenty kilometers from Benghazi, was publicly revealed on February 14, 2016, by the Libya Observer website¹⁵.

Indeed, the dilemma is in the double recognition of the two parts of the Libyan civil war : the GNA as the legitimate government which  engaged the Libyans vis-à-vis the international community but also the recognition of the LNA officially in 2016 to put an end to this discreet alliance which  weakened the credit of the French position as a potential force of the peacemaking: the failure of the Paris Peace Conference (29 March 2018) brings Haftar and Sarraj together and concludes with a tentative pathway for new elections. The elections are never organized. As a reminder, the efforts of the French President Emmanuel Macron on that Conference to announce an unconditional ceasefire was rejected by his ally “Marechal Haftar”.

Moreover, France joins an allied camp where it exercises military leadership since it benefits from its military industry, Nevertheless, the nature of those ties via-à-vis Haftar has been criticized by several states as a hybrid coalition who has no  a big chance to coordinate both the Libyan interests and the  Haftar political agenda. In addition to that, the French position seems to go along the objectives of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia not only in military or economic dimensions, but also as part of a regional ideological battle within the large calculation of the uprisings of 2011 and 2019 across the region¹⁶.

The criticisms  appear understandable for two major reasons: the French position is still more and more problematic as a democratic state who manages to  cooperate with some states which  isolate their internal political life, described as a rentier state which is  scared by  the consequences of a democratic wave in the region like the UAE and Egypt.  The second reason is that  France is part of Unified protector is a NATO operation that came after the success of the unilateral American intervention “Odyssey Down”

 The problem with the states who back up Haftar since the beginning of the second Libyan war is the following : they refuse to recognize that the failure to resolve the Libyan case was a direct consequence of their failure to exercise any kind of pressure on the head of LNA.

The French perspective to support Haftar remains  justified on different levels: Economic opportunities (Expanded economic partnership) and Security insurance (Counterterrorism in Sahel; European policy). In addition, that situation reflects some traditional tools on the French doctrine of power, Jean Guisnel believes that helping the very tough Haftar to emerge as a strong man is a tradition of Françafrique »¹⁷.

After the analysis of the effects of double recognition and the partnership with some mistrustful regimes on the region whose have a selective choice on the Libyan future, the third pivot will be concentrated on the following statement : the different initiatives of Elysée showed clearly that France is conscious of the principal role that could be played with the condition of … in the gap of the European Union.

In that context, The European willingness preferred the diplomatic tools especially with Germany and Italy which showed an interest for the common stakes that could be for the European Union. That European agglomeration must show more solidarity, effectiveness, and rationality to avoid a possible exclusion especially in the emergence of two big camps: the GNA-Turkey (Turkish militias used in Syria) and the LNA-Russia (Wagner group), a competition with an operational organization which  has been experimented on the Syrian Territory.

Similarly, European capitals rejected any possibility of a common European mission to deploy air, satellite, and naval assets to police routine violations of the United Nations-imposed arms embargo¹⁸. A situation that clearly reveals the absence of a common defense policy under the gap of European Union. The different conferences were considered as a meeting for an amical discussion not a true platform to negotiate or to set up an influential soft power.

Nassima Ouhab-Alathamneh, Professor at the Nanterre University                   Walid Es-Sakr, M2 Global Security, University of Bordeaux      

¹ The proclamation of the autonomy of Cyrenaica after the overthrow of Gaddafi finds its essence in the federal history of Libya after the Second World War. From 1951 to 1963, Libya, then called the United Kingdom of Libya, was divided into three federations: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. The discovery of oil in 1958, along with social tensions within the country, prompted the king to reunite the three provinces and abolish federalism from the constitution. AFP :  » Autonomy of Cyrenaica : Libya threatened with partition ? » », Published on June 5, 2013 on the site http://www.france24.com

 ² TILOUIN Joan: “Ibrahim el- Jadhran, the man who challenges Tripoli”, article published on January 13, 2014 on the site http://www.jeuneafrique.com

 ³ AFP:  » Libyan oil under fire from rival factions « , article published on March 22, 2015 on the site http://www.i24news.tv

 ⁴ The Deputy Prime Minister of the official government, Abdel Salam al Badri, considers that the exchange with the NOC of Tripoli amounts to  » financing groups classified as terrorist « , AFP, article of March 22, 2015, Ibid. 

  ⁵ Tarek Megerisi, Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya’s Civil War, Africa Security Brief a publication of the Africa center for strategic studies, No. 37 | May 2020, Page 2

 ⁶ Cherkaoui, Mohammed, Libya’s Zero-Sum Politics and Defiance of Legitimacy – Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Reports, Part 2 May 14, 2020, Part 2

 ⁷ Hurst, Libya, and the Gulf: Revolution and Counter-revolution, 16 December 2011 | Kristian Coates Ulrichsen https://www.hurstpublishers.com/libya-and-the-gulf-revolution-and-counter-revolution/

⁸ https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/convergence-of-crises-egypt

⁹ https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/convergence-of-crises-egypt

¹⁰ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-cairo-declaration-is-a-false-resolution-to-lybias-conflict/

 ¹¹ Tarek Megerisi, Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya’s Civil War, Africa Security Brief, a publication of the Africa center for strategic studies, No. 37 | May 2020, Page 07

¹² NATACHA PERRIN ET JULES PALLESCHI, Ingérence étrangère en Libye : internationalisation d’un bourbier régional, Le Journal International, 3 JUIN 2020, http://www.lejournalinternational.info/ingerence-etrangere-en-libye-internationalisation-dun-bourbier-regional/

¹³ Emile Bouvier, De la Syrie à la Libye, la Turquie sur tous les fronts : résumé et analyse. Deuxième partie : la Libye, un nouveau front aussi épineux diplomatiquement que militairement pour la Turquie, Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, 24/01/2020, https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/De-la-Syrie-a-la-Libye-la-Turquie-sur-tous-les-fronts-resume-et-analyse-3082.html

 ¹⁴ Unified protector is a NATO operation that came after the success of the unilateral American intervention “Odyssey Down”

 ¹⁵ Guisnel, Jean, Histoire secrète de la DGSE, Éditions Robert Laffont, S.A.S., Paris, 2019, Page 81

 ¹⁶ Cherkaoui, Mohammed, Libya’s Zero-Sum Politics and Defiance of Legitimacy – Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Reports, Part 2 May 14, 2020, Page 07

 ¹⁷ Les ingérences françaises en Libye de plus en plus difficiles à dissimuler, Agence Andalou, Ekip, 30/06/2020 https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/monde/les-ing%C3%A9rences-francaises-en-libye-de-plus-en-plus-difficiles-%C3%A0-dissimuler/1894604

  ¹⁸ Tarek Megirisi, how to repair Europe’s credibility in Libya, European Council on Foreign Affairs, 16 January 2020, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_to_repair_europes_credibility_in_libya3/

Academic Tools:

 Guisnel, Jean, Histoire secrète de la DGSE, Éditions Robert Laffont, S.A.S., Paris, 2019, 269 Pages

Cherkaoui, Mohammed, Libya’s Zero-Sum Politics and Defiance of Legitimacy – Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Reports, Part 2 May 14, 2020

Tarek Megerisi, Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya’s Civil War, Africa Security Brief, a publication of the Africa center for strategic studies, No. 37 | May 2020, 10 Pages

Journalistic Articles:

Maged Atef, A Convergence of Crises for Egypt: Libya, Ethiopia, and Northern Sinai, Policy Analsis/ Fikra Forum , Sep 18, 2020 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/convergence-crises-egypt-libya-ethiopia-and-northern-sinai

Emile Bouvier, De la Syrie à la Libye, la Turquie sur tous les fronts : résumé et analyse. Deuxième partie : la Libye, un nouveau front aussi épineux diplomatiquement que militairement pour la Turquie, Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, 24/01/2020, https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/De-la-Syrie-a-la-Libye-la-Turquie-sur-tous-les-fronts-resume-et-analyse-3082.html

TILOUIN Joan: “Ibrahim el- Jadhran, the man who challenges Tripoli”, article published on January 13, 2014 on the site http://www.jeuneafrique.com

Tarek Megirisi, how to repair Europe’s credibility in Libya, European Council on Foreign Affairs, 16 January 2020, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_to_repair_europes_credibility_in_libya3/

Karim Mezran, Alessia Melcangi, The Cairo Declaration is a false resolution to Libya’s conflict, Atlantic Council, 11 Juin 2020 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-cairo-declaration-is-a-false-resolution-to-libyas-conflict/

NATACHA PERRIN ET JULES PALLESCHI, Ingérence étrangère en Libye : internationalisation d’un bourbier régional, Le Journal International, 3 JUIN 2020, http://www.lejournalinternational.info/ingerence-etrangere-en-libye-internationalisation-dun-bourbier-regional/

Hurst, Libya, and the Gulf: Revolution and Counter-revolution, 16 December 2011 | Kristian Coates Ulrichsen https://www.hurstpublishers.com/libya-and-the-gulf-revolution-and-counter-revolution/

AFP:  » Libyan oil under fire from rival factions « , article published on March 22, 2015 on the site http://www.i24news.tv

AFP:  » Autonomy of Cyrenaica : Libya threatened with partition ? » », Published on June 5, 2013 on the site http://www.france24.com

Les ingérences françaises en Libye de plus en plus difficiles à dissimuler, Agence Andalou, Ekip, 30/06/2020 https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/monde/les-ing%C3%A9rences-francaises-en-libye-de-plus-en-plus-difficiles-%C3%A0-dissimuler/1894604