By Julie Eifler Bolander

Since the revival of bilateral diplomacy in 2022, cooperation between Japan and South Korea has significantly intensified, particularly in security matters, alongside the United States, in response to regional challenges posed by North Korea and China. In this perspective, this article aims at showing that the absence of formalisation in Japan-South Korea relations is in fact a strategy that enables closer cooperation without the constraints of an official alliance. Indeed, it allows both nations to bypass domestic obstacles, historical tensions and economic imperatives tied to China, while developing effective cooperation mechanisms, particularly within a trilateral framework with Washington.

Yoon Suk Yeol, Joe Biden et Fumio Kishida le 18 août 2023. Source : Foto Ansa/Epa Yonhap

In August 2023, Japan, South Korea and the United States met in Camp David in order to implement a program of joint military exercises. During the meeting, they pointed out the two main threats that were concerning them, North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s behaviour and ambitions, even though they all denied wanting to formalise a tripartite alliance. But if Japan and the United States, and South Korea and the United States already entered formal alliances, it is still not the case between Japan and South Korea. Besides, this occurred in a context in which diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea got back on track in 2022 after several years of tensions. In March 2023, a historical summit brought together Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South-Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in Tokyo. They agreed on the fact that in the current geopolitical context, their relations had to be strengthened, and they revived the shuttle diplomacy that was interrupted in 2011. 

This meeting also occurred in a context in which the United States seems to pivot their focus again on Asia, and more specifically Eastern Asia, since the tensions with China are intensifying. If during decades, most scholars were trying to predict what would happen with the continuing withdrawal of the United States from the region, it seems that this new focus and the redefinition of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic area put these questions in a new light. Indeed, the choice of the expression “Indo-Pacific” first covers a larger area than the one that was covered by the expression “Asia-Pacific”, or just “Eastern Asia”. It also aims at challenging the claimed centrality of China, since the global community expects for example India to gain a more important role in the area. Moreover, this leads to give to the United States a status of local legitimate actor, and not only of foreign presence in the area. This expression was put forward by the United States in their strategic framework, and progressively adopted by many  countries in the region, and worldwide. South Korea published in 2022 its “Strategy for a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region”¹, as did Japan in 2023². If this new concept partly aimed to relativise People’s Republic of China’s central role, it could also have contributed to marginalising certain Asia-Pacific powers which are now included in a wider zone with more States, like South Korea and Japan. However, it seems that it leads to a strengthening of their relations, facing China.

The reshaping of the geopolitical balance in the region therefore aims at reanalysing Japan and South Korea relations. If the United States are undeniably a major historical drive of this relation, it seems that these last years, both countries have been making efforts to bring their relation to the next level. In its “Strategy for a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region”, South Korea characterised Japan as an essential partner, whereas for the People’s Republic of China, it is stated that the Republic of Korea is seeking to establish a “more mature relationship […] based on mutual respect and reciprocity, guided by international norms and rules”³. At Camp David, both countries alongside the United States asserted that they planned to deepen their trilateral platform of cooperation in all areas, and they put an emphasis on security cooperation. Even though they always reiterate that it was not a summit about China, they all condemned its dangerous and aggressive behaviour and reasserted that peace and stability was to be sought in the Taiwan Strait.

Given all these elements, it could be awaited that Japan and South Korea enter and formalise a security alliance, and yet both countries are still reluctant to do so. However, it does not seem to be an obstacle in their relation, and it might even be an element that allows them to compose with their domestic interests as well as with their shared economic interests in the region – especially with China. Therefore, to what extent does the absence of formalisation of an alliance between Japan and South Korea is in fact a modality and a strategy allowing them to freely deepen their relation while preserving their domestic and shared interests ?

Between determinism and impossibility of an alliance: scholars’ analysis  

Among the questions surrounding the relations between Japan and South Korea, a lot of scholars often tried to give an answer to the following: is there or is there not an alliance between Japan and South Korea, and is a formal alliance possible or desirable ? However, focusing on the formalisation of the alliance does not really allow us to understand the progress their relation made even though they did not enter a formal alliance. 

• The idea of an impossible alliance

First of all, several papers argued that no alignment or deepening of security relations were even possible between Japan and South Korea. Indeed, scholars like Key-Young Son argued that these two countries, as “middle powers”, would not seek the deepening of their bilateral relation because they would prefer to institutionalise their dependency on the great power, the United States (“norm of dependency”), and to actively engage with a rising great power, China (“norm of activism”). First of all, we could criticise the idea according to which Japan and South Korea would both be “middle powers”, especially in the perspective of the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, Japan is the 3^rd economic power in the world (in terms of GDP), and 2^nd after China in Eastern Asia. Therefore, it is hard to consider both Japan and South Korea in the same category of “power”. But more importantly, Key-Young Son also predicted that South Korea would rather seek alignment with China than with Japan. Or, it seems that nowadays’ situation leads to an increased political proximity between Japan and South Korea, whereas relations with China are mainly maintained for economic reasons. Indeed, the predicted alignment with China was supposed to be justified by the fact that South Korea needed China’s support in order to hope for a reunification with North Korea. However, these last years showed that this idea of reunification sort of disappeared from the political discourses. Therefore, both Japan and South Korea seem to aim at not offending China, in order to protect their shared economic interests with the country. But alongside this strategy, they point out China’s aggressive behaviour and discuss at the same table, with the United States, about an increased security cooperation.

• The observation of an implementation of low-intensity military cooperation

In the same perspective, some scholars, like Jason U. Manosevitz, recognised that the implementation of low-intensity military cooperation was possible between Japan and South Korea, but stated that a real unlimited security alliance would increase the instability in the region. Indeed, he shows that the two countries progressively implemented direct military contacts, and that it brought resilience in their relations, especially during periods of political tensions. In nowadays’ perspective, as the shuttle diplomacy got revived, it seems indeed that those military contacts maintained the background for diplomatic relations. However, he asserts that an unlimited cooperation in their security relation would create a power imbalance in the area – especially since both countries are very advanced in terms of technologies. In fact, it seems that instability has already been increased in the region because of China’s behavior, especially towards Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Moreover, China now is the 3^rd military power in the world, with the biggest army in the world, including 2 million soldiers and approximately 500 000 reservists⁴. The Chinese authorities also increased the military budget (in 2023, 6% growth compared to 2021⁵), and the country is now ranked 2^nd in the world in terms of number of aircraft carriers. In 2017, during the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping also declared that the aim was to have an entirely modernised military in 2035, and a world-class army by 2049. Therefore, it seems that a deepened cooperation between Japan and South Korea would in fact bring back balance in the area. Also, Jason U. Manosevitz argued that if both countries do have the same interests as the United States in the case of North Korea, it does not mean that they would actually follow the United States’ policy in the case of Taiwan. Or, when analysing the declarations that followed Camp David, it seems that South Korea, like Japan, condemns China’s ambitions over Taiwan. In fact, if both countries try to maintain good relations with China in order to preserve their economic interests, they also take into consideration that the Taiwan Strait is a major route of commercial maritime transportation (48% of cargos in the world), and that a conflict in the region would also highly impact their economies. Therefore, it seems that contrary to what Jason U. Manosevitz wrote, Japan and South Korea seem to agree both on the North Korean and on the Taiwanese issues.

• The theory of a “virtual alliance” and determinism

After having answered the questions about the possibility for Japan and South Korea to strengthen bilateral relations or security relations, and about the fact that they did agree on major geopolitical issues in the area, we have to focus on the question of the alliance itself. Indeed, as said before, most scholars focused on the possibility of formalising an alliance for Japan and South Korea. Some, like Victor Cha, even theorised the concept of a “virtual alliance”. According to him, it means that Japan, South Korea and the United States align on most issues in the area, and that as the United States will progressively withdraw their troops for the region, Japan and South Korea will strengthen their security relations and eventually enter a formal alliance. However, this assumption is today challenged by the fact that the United States seems to have pivoted their focus back on Eastern Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the fact that there is a kind of determinism about the alignment of Japan and South Korea does not allow us to really understand their actual relations. Indeed, it seems that South Korea and Japan choose to strengthen their ties, including in security cooperation, but while denying any form of formal alliance. However, it does not mean that it has to lead to one, or that their relation, because of the lack of formalisation, cannot be strong enough to face the region’s geopolitical issues. In fact, it seems that for several reasons, this absence of formal alliance is the best modality that both countries found to deepen their relations while protecting their interests. First of all, as we said before, they both try to protect their economic interests, which are tightly linked to China, but also to the stability in the maritime zone that are crucial for cargos. Moreover, several domestic issues might make it more difficult to enter a formal alliance, than to keep deepening their relations without formalisation. Indeed, as shown by Van Jackson, public opinions and the ongoing disputes over historical and territorial issues are important elements that matter in the relation between Japan and South Korea. In his opinion, it even created antagonistic bilateral ties, making a bilateral convergence impossible. However, we could interpret the absence of formalisation as a way to answer these domestic issues, and still keep on deepening the relations.

The absence of formalization: a way to address both domestic and international issues

• The recent increasing of cooperation between Japan and South Korea

First of all, we will focus on proving that there was an important increase of the cooperation between Japan and South Korea, including in the security and defence dimensions, especially since the renewal of their diplomatic relations in 2022.

Since 2022, cooperation between Japan and South Korea has indeed increased considerably. But if this change is striking, it is because the previous decade was marked by an important slowdown in cooperation agreements, due to the politico-historical tensions between the two countries. It is therefore appropriate first to summarise the state of cooperation prior to 2023, and then to focus on the new deepenings and new dimensions.

Between 2010 and 2022, despite their strained relations, the two countries signed a number of cooperation agreements. While some of these agreements concerned security, none of them made any concrete advances in terms of joint defence. One example is the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), signed on 23 November 2016⁶, which aims to facilitate the sharing of classified military information on common threats, such as North Korea.  However, due to tensions between the two countries, this agreement was underused, and in 2019, when tensions reached an exceptional level, the Moon Jae-in administration sent a suspension notice to the Japanese authorities. It was only under pressure from the United States that South Korea suspended the effect of the notice, but without withdrawing it. On 21 March 2023, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration informed Japan of the withdrawal of the notice and the suspension of its effect, with the aim of « normalising » this agreement which was now presented as vital⁷. More generally, during this difficult period, the two countries deepened their cooperation in terms of responding to natural disasters, and therefore in the field of security.

Relations between the two countries improved from 2022, and a trilateral exercise focusing on anti-ballistic defence and undersea warfare was organised with the United States⁸. In September 2022, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of the Governments of the Republic of Korea and Japan issued a joint statement on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly to « reaffirm their commitment to strong trilateral cooperation as [they] seek to address urgent 21st century challenges »⁹. This joint statement was also an opportunity to recall the U.S. steadfast commitments to the defence of the ROK and Japan, and the importance of trilateral cooperation to strengthen the rules-based economic order and promote prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world. In November 2022, on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh, Prime Minister Kishida, President Yoon and President Biden reaffirmed their trilateral partnership by announcing an unprecedented level of cooperation. They asserted:

« At the same time, the three countries will work together to strengthen deterrence. President Biden reiterated that the U.S. commitment to defend Japan and the ROK is ironclad and backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear. As the regional security environment grows more challenging, President Biden reaffirms that the U.S. commitment to reinforce extended deterrence to Japan and the ROK will only strengthen. Our recent joint exercises demonstrate our resolve to maintain peace and stability and defend the rules-based international order.”¹⁰

In August 2023, the Camp David meeting marked a real turning point in cooperation between the two countries, under the aegis of the United States. Of course, the decision to hold several high-intensity military exercises clearly altered the objectives of the cooperation. These trilateral military exercises will be held annually, and will cover all dimensions: air, land, sea, submarine and cyberspace¹¹. A cooperation mechanism for anti-ballistic defence has also been activated, to improve the detection of North Korean missiles. A working group on North Korean cyber activities was also set up to coordinate the intelligence services of the three countries with regard to cyber threats emanating from North Korea¹². Following this meeting, the three countries organised a naval exercise marked by the presence of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan. The exercise focused on detecting and tracking targets, as well as training for intercepting North Korean weapons of mass destruction. The very first trilateral air exercise between the three countries was also organised in October 2023, « in response to evolving North Korean nuclear threats »¹³. This exercise included :

“One American B-52 bomber and three U.S. F-16s flew alongside two F-15Ks from the Republic of Korea Air Force, and four F-2s from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.”¹⁴

This definitely takes the nature of this cooperation to a higher level of intensity. Finally, in January 2024, the three countries organised their biggest-ever combined naval exercises, again with a view to improving response capabilities in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea. It is therefore clear that the renewal of relations between the two countries has been accompanied by an acceleration and deepening of their cooperation.

• The rejection of any formalisation of an alliance

Although the three countries have considerably stepped up the pace of their cooperation since 2022, and more particularly since Camp David, we will now focus on the fact that they are nevertheless very careful to deny any desire to formalise an alliance. Numerous terms are used in official communiqués, for example in the Joint Statement on the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Ministerial Meeting¹⁵  of 12 February 2022, to describe the relationship between the countries: « friendship », « cooperation », « collaboration », « cooperational friendship », « common approaches ». The deepening of relations is also formulated as follows: « to advance trilateral security cooperation ». So there is no question of transforming the nature of the current cooperation between the three countries, but simply of intensifying the level of cooperation.

Moreover, at the Camp David meeting, the three countries made it clear that they did not want to formalise their partnership¹⁶. Thus there is a constant denial of any form of formalisation, particularly between Japan and South Korea – since each already has an alliance with the United States. In the same vein, the White House former principal National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, has also stated that this enhanced cooperation is in no way a NATO for the Pacific¹⁷.  It is therefore clear that the efforts made by the three countries to draw closer together remain far removed from any attempt to formalise an alliance. While many commentators have pointed out that the two countries could not in any case formally gather because of the historical tensions linked to the Japanese colonial period, it would be interesting to consider that a formal alliance might be possible. However, this constant denial of any desire for formalisation actually corresponds to a strategy on the part of the two countries that allows them to take their partnership to a much higher level than if they were trying to formalise an alliance of some kind. In fact, from the point of view of public opinion in the two countries, this would surely be a much more far-reaching process, especially in light of recent years and the very high tensions that culminated in 2019.

• The circumvention of historical national tensions

However, in the current geopolitical context, the growing threats faced by the two countries, on the one hand from North Korea, but also from China’s increasingly aggressive attitude, mean that they cannot organise a formal rapprochement with a long-term outcome. In fact, they run the risk of inflaming public opinion, which would slow down the process, and of being unable to forge a formal alliance in time. This does not mean that they are incapable of building an alliance in the long term, but the timeframe required for such a change in the nature of their relationship, particularly with regard to their public opinion, does not allow for an adequate response to the current timeframe of geopolitical changes in the region. In fact, President Yoon even declared that even if South Korea is  still awaiting compensation from Japan in relation to the colonial past, “[they] can’t let historical issues stop [them] from taking steps forward”¹⁸. It shows that this strategy enables the two countries to separate the security issues from the historical ones, and that both these dimensions have their own pace. The lack of formalisation allows in fact this division of topics, and the possibility to move forward at different paces in each of them.

• The willingness to protect their economic relations with China 

Moreover, while North Korea regularly condemns any attempt at rapprochement between the two countries, and the joint exercises they organise with the United States, it is rather the reception of such cooperation by China that is also a major issue for Japan and South Korea. Indeed, the growing threat posed by China, notably through its potential destabilisation in the Taiwan Strait and its aggressive attitude in the China and South China Seas, was discussed during the Camp David summit. However, China remains a key economic partner for both countries, as it is their main trading partner. Thus, by denying any desire to formalise an alliance, Japan and South Korea are adopting an unofficial strategy of deepening their relations without China being able to really challenge it. Therefore, it could be said that rather than being an obstacle, this lack of formalisation is the most strategic way for the two countries to strengthen their cooperation, including in the field of defence, in a context where their public opinion and their main economic partner would not accept an alliance, or at least not immediately, and for different reasons.

As in the trilateral communiqués, the two countries have also adopted a particular lexical style in their official statements. In fact, they even avoid using the term « cooperation », unlike in the joint statements with the United States, preferring instead to refer to « a new chapter »¹⁹, or a « big step »²⁰ in their relationship. In March 2023, at the Tokyo summit between the two countries, Prime Minister Kishida even declared: « Cherry blossoms just started blooming in Tokyo this week, and after a long winter season, in terms of our bilateral relations, Japan is now able to welcome the president of South Korea for the first time in 12 years »²¹. It is clear, therefore, that despite the desire to strengthen their cooperation, the political leaders of both countries are reluctant  to use any terms that could lead to confusion about their intentions, at least in press conferences or joint statements they make in the absence of the United States.

This leads to two conclusions. First, the fact that, once again, by publicly maintaining a position of refusing to talk about any potential alliance, at least in the short and medium term, they are in fact developing their cooperation in greater depth. Secondly, it is clear that the two countries are also using the United States as a common ground. Indeed, they are deepening their security and defence relations almost exclusively in a trilateral format. The trilateral nature of this cooperation is constantly reaffirmed in trilateral communiqués, leaving no room for speculation about a potential bilateral alliance between Japan and South Korea. Similarly, the distinction between trilateral cooperation and the two existing alliances, between Japan and the United States on the one hand, and between South Korea and the United States on the other, is even reiterated in what was said at Camp David: « At the summit, the leaders will celebrate a new chapter in their trilateral relationship as they reaffirm their strong bonds of friendship and the ironclad alliances between the United States and Japan, and the United States and the Republic of Korea »²². Then, by highlighting the fact that the United States is the common ground for this deeper cooperation, the two countries can ultimately make their rapprochement more acceptable in the eyes of public opinion. In fact, the United States enjoys a good image in both countries, due to its long-standing ties with each, as well as its role in their economic development. What’s more, the United States is seen as the most important security partner for both countries, and it is therefore strategic for them to try to show that getting closer to each other is in fact an essential way of preserving their respective bilateral relationship with the United States. Moreover, the fact that there is no formal alliance between Japan and South Korea may even be interpreted by public opinion as their ability to contain the ambitions of the United States to a certain extent, which can only strengthen the image of the leaders in question at national level.

Insights about future developments of this rapprochement

So it seems that both Japan and South Korea are using the lack of formalisation of any alliance as a strategy to deepen their cooperation, including in the military field. This enables them to respond promptly and effectively to the gradually deteriorating geopolitical context in East Asia without offending their respective public opinion or their economic interests in relation to China. This means constantly denying the desire for an alliance, and playing down the nature of their closer cooperation in the media, but also promoting the United States as the main factor in their rapprochement. This could be tantamount to shirking responsibility in the eyes of public opinion, but the absence of formalisation in fact allows the authorities to support their position by showing that they are containing US ambitions and making their national interests heard. This strategy therefore has a somewhat complex architecture, but one that allows the two countries considerable latitude in advancing their cooperation.

This raises the question of the future development of this rapprochement, and of future prospects for potential formalisation. Given all the elements examined above, two main hypotheses can be established.

Firstly, from the point of view of the respective public opinion, it is certain that in the short term, formalisation is not an option. The wounds associated with the colonial period are deeply rooted in society, especially as they are regularly rekindled by political and media debates. The acceptance of formalisation would therefore presuppose greater rapprochement between the two civil societies, through person-to-person exchanges, and a resolution of the historic issues that still divide them today. However, the end of the colonial period was less than a century ago, and it is generally considered that a fairly long period of time is needed following such traumatic events in order to allow the necessary distance to be taken for a genuine social normalisation of relations between the countries (the temporality of which is different from diplomatic and political normalisation).

However, upheavals in global and regional geopolitics could also be a factor accelerating a potential process of concluding a formal alliance between the two countries. Indeed, while it is not in the interests of either South Korea or Japan to damage their relations with China from an economic point of view, such damage would be inevitable in the event of regional destabilisation. Indeed, if China goes on the offensive against Taiwan, the prevailing logic of economic and political equilibrium in the region will no longer apply, and an alliance could be formed in response to such destabilisation. What’s more, public opinion would probably be less reluctant to accept such an alliance in the event of such an upheaval. Indeed, a Chinese offensive on Taiwan would be likely to galvanise the threat posed by North Korea, and this issue would therefore become a priority – and thus largely relegate issues relating to historical disputes with Japan to second place.

Therefore, we could say that in the short term, unless there is a real geopolitical upheaval, it does not seem possible to formalise an alliance. It would be more likely in the long term, or in the event of a major upheaval that would pose a considerable threat to the security of both countries.

Footnotes

1. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, December 28, 2022, online ↩︎
2. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, March 20, 2023, online ↩︎
3. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, December 28, 2022, p14, online ↩︎
4. Thibault, Harold, and Leplâtre, Simon, “How Xi put China’s army in order”, Le Monde, February 16, 2025, online ↩︎
5. Tian, Nan, Lopes da Silva, Diego, Liang, Xiao liang and Scarazzato Lorenzo, TRENDS IN WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 2023, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2024, online ↩︎
6. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION, November 23, 2016, online ↩︎
7. Suzuki, Takuya and Inada, Kiyohide, “S. Korea notifies Japan of ‘normalization’ of GSOMIA pact”, The Asahi Shimbun, March 22, 2023, online ↩︎
8. US Department of State, Joint Statement on the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting, February 13, 2023, online ↩︎
9. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement on the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Foreign Ministerial Meeting, September 22, 2022, online ↩︎
10. US Mission to ASEAN, Phnom Penh Statement on Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific, November 14, 2022, online ↩︎
11. Harris, Bryant and Robertson, Noah, “Biden brokers new defense commitments between Japan, South Korea”, Defense News, August 19, 2023, online ↩︎
12. White House, Fact Sheet : The Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David, August 18, 2023, online ↩︎
13. Kim, Hyunng-Jin, “US, South Korea and Japan hold first-ever trilateral aerial exercise”, Military Times, October 24, 2023, online ↩︎
14. Harpley, Unshin Lee, “US, S. Korea, Japan hold first ever trilateral air exercise, with B-52 and fighters”, Air&Space forces magazine, October 23, 2023, online ↩︎
15. US Department of State, Joint Statement on the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting, February 12, 2022, online ↩︎
16. Mesmer, Philippe, “Les Etats-Unis, le Japon et la Corée du sud resserrent leur coopération contre la menace chinoise et nord-coréenne”, Le Monde, August 19, 2023, online ↩︎
17. TV5MONDE, “États-Unis : réunion « historique » à Camp David avec les dirigeants japonais et coréen”, TV5MONDE, August 19, 2023, online ↩︎
18. Borowiec, Steven, “Kishida and Yoon tout ‘new departure’ for South Korea-Japan ties”, Nikkei Asia, May 7, 2023, online ↩︎
19. Mackenzie, Jean, “South Korea and Japan: A milestone meeting of frenemies”, BBC, March 16, 2023, online ↩︎
20. Yamaguchi, Mari, “Japan, South Korea renew ties at Tokyo summit”, AP News, March 17, 2023, online ↩︎
21. ABC, “Japan and South Korea renew ties at Tokyo summit with historic meeting between leaders”, ABC News, March 16, 2023, online ↩︎
22. US Mission Japan, “Trilateral Leaders’ Summit of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea”, August 19, 2023, online ↩︎

References

Academic references

Cha, Victor. 2000. “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea”, International Studies Quarterly, 44(2): 261–91.

Mansosevitz, Jason U. 2003. « Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence. » Asian Survey 43 (5) (Sep): 801-825.

Son, Key-Young. 2014. « Middle Powers and the Rise of China: ‘Identity Norms’ of Dependency and Activism and the Outlook for Japan-South Korea Relations Vis-à-Vis the Great Powers. » Japanese Journal of Political Science 15 (1): 91-112.

Tian, Nan, Lopes da Silva, Diego, Liang, Xiao liang and Scarazzato Lorenzo, TRENDS IN WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 2023, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2024, online

Van Jackson, “Buffers, Not Bridges: Rethinking Multilateralism and the Resilience of Japan-South Korea Friction”, International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 1, March 2018, Pages 127–151

Press articles

ABC, “Japan and South Korea renew ties at Tokyo summit with historic meeting between leaders”, ABC News, March 16, 2023, online

Borowiec, Steven, “Kishida and Yoon tout ‘new departure’ for South Korea-Japan ties”, Nikkei Asia, May 7, 2023, online

Harpley, Unshin Lee, “US, S. Korea, Japan hold first ever trilateral air exercise, with B-52 and fighters”, Air&Space forces magazine, October 23, 2023, online

Harris, Bryant and Robertson, Noah, “Biden brokers new defense commitments between Japan, South Korea”, Defense News, August 19, 2023, online

Kim, Hyunng-Jin, “US, South Korea and Japan hold first-ever trilateral aerial exercise”, Military Times, October 24, 2023, online

Mackenzie, Jean, “South Korea and Japan: A milestone meeting of frenemies”, BBC, March 16, 2023, online

Mesmer, Philippe, “Les Etats-Unis, le Japon et la Corée du sud resserrent leur coopération contre la menace chinoise et nord-coréenne”, Le Monde, August 19, 2023, online

Suzuki, Takuya, and Inada, Kiyohide, “S. Korea notifies Japan of ‘normalization’ of GSOMIA pact”, The Asahi Shimbun, March 22, 2023, online

Thibault, Harold, and Leplâtre, Simon, “How Xi put China’s army in order”, Le Monde, February 16, 2025, online

TV5MONDE, “États-Unis : réunion « historique » à Camp David avec les dirigeants japonais et coréen”, TV5MONDE, August 19, 2023, online