“Blood diamonds”: A symbol of the connection between conflict and natural resources in Africa
By Justine Gadon-Ferreira
Translated by Juliet Tyler-Bragg, Lou Steins, Jonathan Wynne-Bärwald and Hector Cooper
This article was originally published in French on September 26th, 2019. You can read it here: Les « diamants du sang » : symbole du lien entre conflits et ressources en Afrique
Buried within the African landmass are the world’s main diamond reserves. While they are vital to some African economies, diamonds have quickly become a major source of contention in power struggles (Châtaigner, 2007). A causal link has therefore been established between mineral reserves and the civil wars that have affected several African countries such as Angola (1975-2002), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1996-2003).
In 2000, the Kimberley Process was established on South Africa’s initiative. Bringing together representatives from states, diamond mining companies, and civil society, this tripartite international forum aims to put a stop to the trade of what are known as “blood diamonds”. According to the definition adopted by the UN, “blood diamonds” are “rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance their military operations, particularly in attempts to destabilise or overthrow legitimate governments” (Breteau, 2018). The Kimberley Process’s mission is to certify to consumers that the diamonds they purchase have not been used to fund armed conflicts. However, nearly twenty years after the creation of the Kimberley Process, “blood diamonds” have yet to disappear completely. In 2013, in the Central African Republic, the illegal exploitation of diamond reserves helped finance the Seleka rebel coalition, which eventually overthrew President François Bozizé. In 2017, the NGO Global Witness uncovered the existence of a smuggling network that was using Facebook and Instagram to sell diamonds extracted from conflict zones in the Central African Republic to buyers all over the world (Charrié, 2018).
The role of diamonds in African conflicts
The expression “blood diamond” was first used during the Angolan Civil War (1975-2002). At the time, there was a struggle for power between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). A UN mission revealed that, to finance its war efforts, UNITA was trading rough diamonds extracted from the mines under its control in exchange for weapons. Rough diamonds were also sold for cash, which was then used to purchase weaponry. In June 1999, under pressure from Canada, the UN decided to impose an embargo on exports of Angolan diamonds. UNITA was severely weakened, deprived not only of one of its main sources of funding for its political and military operations, but also of international recognition. The UN sanctions allowed the MPLA to assert its legitimacy and oust UNITA, which has since been considered a rebel group in the eyes of the international community. Nevertheless, diamonds only played a secondary role in Angola, since the main source of income for this Portuguese-speaking country was – and remains – oil, and the conflict was largely structured around the control of this resource.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), diamonds did more than simply fund warlords. Diamonds played an essential role during the Congo Wars (1996-2003), as unlike in Angola, diamond production was the DRC’s main source of income. The First Congo War (1996-1997) was triggered by an ethnopolitical dispute after the dictator Mobutu refused to grant Congolese nationality to members of the Banyarwanda ethnic group. The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), spearheaded by Désiré Kabila, took up arms and attempted to remove the dictator from power. The AFDL was funded through contracts signed with Western companies concerning the exploitation of diamond mines, notably with Canada, the United States, and Israel. Strengthened by this substantial funding, Kabila succeeded in overthrowing Mobutu and became President of the DRC in 1997. During the Second Congo War, on the other hand, control over the major Congolese diamond mines was at the heart of the conflict. This war pitted the DRC and its Namibian, Angolan, and Zimbabwean allies against Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda, countries with a keen interest in Congolese diamond concessions.
Edward Zwick’s 2006 film Blood Diamond drew the international community’s attention to the role that diamonds played in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia (1991-2002). According to the NGO IMPACT (formerly Partnership Africa Canada), “Diamonds, in fact, have fuelled Sierra Leone’s conflict, destabilising the country for the better part of three decades, stealing its patrimony and robbing an entire generation of children” (Sierra Leone Working Group, 2000). In these countries also, diamonds were used to finance the activities of armed groups such as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which managed to topple the legitimate government. Moreover, the NPFL and its branch active in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), are infamous for their extensive use of child soldiers. In Liberia, as in the other aforementioned countries, the state was not strong enough to ensure the responsible governance of this highly strategically valuable resource. It is for this reason that diamond revenues flowed into smuggling networks instead of the state’s coffers.
Embargos and the creation of the Kimberley Process
Two types of measures were adopted by the international community to clamp down on the trade of “blood diamonds”.
The first was embargos, which aimed to close off any legal outlets for diamond production in a country at war. The impact of these embargos was mainly political. In fact, the embargos established by the UN often fuelled smuggling in war-torn countries, thus proving ineffective. In Angola and Liberia, diamonds were sold through illegal networks, as they could not be traded legally through international channels.
The other significant measure taken by the international community was the Kimberley Process. Its primary aim was to eradicate the blood diamond trade. Today, it brings together 81 countries on a voluntary basis, with a rotating presidency. In 2019, India took over from the European Union. In 2020, Russia is due to take the reins and assume the presidency of the Process. The principle of the KP is very simple: every country that produces diamonds must provide a certificate attesting that no diamond exported comes from a war zone. Producing countries must also organise internal inspections and provide statistics on their diamond trade. Today, thanks to the Kimberley Process, 99.5% of diamonds sold on the international market are certified. The remaining 0.5% comes from countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Central African Republic, where the geopolitical situation is especially unstable. The KP estimates that it has reduced the share of blood diamonds on the international market from 15% to 0.2%. However, these figures should be taken with a grain of salt, since certain producing countries demonstrate a lack of transparency and even falsify their statistics and certifications. Furthermore, according to a group of UN experts, the situation in Central Africa is increasingly concerning; out of the 330,000 carats produced by the DRC in 2018, it is reported that only 9000 were certified before being exported (RFI Afrique, 2019). According to the UN, the majority of the diamonds produced were likely used to fund armed groups.
The limitations of the Kimberley Process
According to the researcher Élise Rousseau, the definition of the term “blood diamond”, adopted in 2000, no longer reflects the contemporary realities of conflict (Breteau, 2018). According to this definition, only the diamonds produced in certain areas of the Central African Republic (CAR) are considered blood diamonds. The definition held by the KP does not take into account the conditions under which diamonds are extracted in other diamond concessions, which often operate in a context of violence, sometimes authorised by the state. New factors are making the situation particularly complex, such as the involvement of private military companies in Central Africa. On July 30th, 2018, three Russian journalists were murdered there while investigating links between the Wagner group, a Russian paramilitary company, and the smuggling of Central African diamonds.
Furthermore, the Kimberley Process still aims to promote the diamond trade and does not pay heed to whether human rights are respected. Workers employed in diamond concessions sometimes work in very harsh conditions. In Angola, there have been many recorded cases of illegal workers of Congolese origin. The KP does not act in any way to ensure proper working conditions for workers in signatory countries.
Nor does the Kimberley Process consider the environmental risk posed by diamond mining. The risks include the pollution of the soil and maritime ares. Diamond mining is also expanding along the coastlines of some African countries; the South African company De Beers is hoping to extract diamonds from the seabed that have been deposited there by the Orange River, off the coast of Namibia, a method which geologists warn could damage the seabed and its ecosystem.
Failed reforms of the Kimberley Process
When the European Union proposed revising the definition of “blood diamonds” at the beginning of its 2018 presidency, African countries criticised the neo-colonial agenda behind the reform. In this context, it was difficult for the European Union to reform the KP. African countries also put forward an economic argument: in their view, if the KP’s mandate were to be expanded, most governments would find themselves unable to certify the origin of diamonds, which would have adverse effects for their economies. The Kimberley Process, according to the researcher Thierry Vircoulon, is “first and foremost a club of producers and consumers seeking to promote trade” (Charrié, 2018). The European Union’s suggestions for reform, such as the creation of a permanent secretariat and a support fund for citizens and member states, have therefore not been implemented. Unanimous voting makes decision-making in the Kimberley Process particularly slow.
Disappointed by this lack of progress, the NGOs Global Witness and Impact decided, in 2011 and 2017 respectively, to withdraw from the Kimberley Process. These two NGOs deplored the Process’s inability to introduce changes and to broaden its definition of blood diamonds. According to the KP’s definition, only rough diamonds used by rebel movements are considered “conflict diamonds”. Some African governments, as a result, take advantage of this definition to violate human rights without being held accountable. In Zimbabwe in 2007, for instance, the army seized one of the diamond mines in Marange, to the east of the country. Eager to monopolise the resources, the soldiers killed more than 200 people, according to the NGO Human Rights Watch. The Zimbabwean army has also extended the use of forced child labour in its diamond mines and reaps the profits of “blood diamonds”, while enjoying complete impunity. Much to the dismay of NGOs, they are still allowed to export these diamonds today, after a brief embargo in 2010.
The Kimberley Process, which succeeded in significantly reducing the trade of blood diamonds on international markets, is now struggling to find new momentum and to address contemporary challenges related to the diamond trade. This tripartite forum, created to boost the commercial appeal of the diamond market, does not place enough emphasis on human rights and the environment. It is difficult to reform the KP, since a unanimous vote is required for any decision. Recognising the role of certain governments in conflicts linked to diamond reserves and implementing sanctions are not currently on the agenda. India, which took over the presidency of the Kimberley Process from the European Union, has been rather hostile towards the reforms proposed by its predecessor. Today, blood diamonds still slip through the cracks in the legal diamond trade, and its main monitoring body, the Kimberley Process, is unable to intervene.
Bibliography
Breteau, P. (2018, August 28). Diamants de sang : pourquoi il faut réformer le processus de Kimberley. Le Monde Afrique. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/08/28/diamants-de-sang-pourquoi-il-faut-reformer-le-processus-de-kimberley_5346971_3212.html
Charrié, A. (2018, January 22). Les diamants de conflits brillent encore. Libération. https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/01/22/les-diamants-de-conflits-brillent-encore_1623052
Châtaigner, J.-M. (2007). Ressources naturelles et conflits en Afrique. Afrique contemporaine, 221(1), 173–195. https://www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine-2007-1-page-173.htm
Europe 1. (n.d.). Les diamants du sang ont-ils vraiment disparu ? https://www.europe1.fr/international/Les-diamants-du-sang-ont-ils-vraiment-disparu-603880
Sierra Leone Working Group. (2000, January). Le cœur du problème : la Sierra Leone, les diamants et la sécurité humaine [The heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds and human security]. Partenariat Afrique Canada.
RFI Afrique. (2019, January 3). RCA : le trafic de diamants finance toujours les groupes armés. https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190103-rca-trafic-diamants-finance-toujours-groupes-armes
Photography: Image taken from Edward Zwick’s 2006 film Blood Diamond (Flickr/Brian Harrington Spier)



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